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This article scrutinizes two concepts central to the ontological security framework, agency and 
anxiety. Its point of departure is the view that conceptions of agency are expressed in the attempt 
to become ontologically secure, which requires a more careful look at how humans try to satisfy 
the need for a ‘stable sense of Self’ by putting in place ‘anxiety controlling mechanisms’. This, 
in turn, raises the question what these mechanisms are supposed to control, which shifts attention 
to the concept of ‘anxiety’. Going back to Kierkegaard’s original treatment and Heidegger’s 
existential phenomenology, the article reviews the emergence of anxiety as a core feature of the 
human condition and highlights what it calls the ‘anxiety paradox’: the tendency of reflexive 
humans facing the freedom of being in time to attach themselves to constructs that provide a 
sense of temporal continuity, or certainty. The article argues that the existing ontological security 
literature is trapped in this paradox and therefore cannot account for radical forms of agency. 
 




An increasing number of constructivist IR scholars use the concept of ontological 
security to explain behaviour in international relations. Adopted from Anthony Giddens,1 they 
understand ontological security as the feeling of having a ‘stable sense of Self’, which is 
considered a basic human need. Such attention to the psychological sensibilities of political 
actors offers a fruitful alternative to the realist emphasis on physical security as the primary 
concern. This article takes a closer look at two concepts central to the ontological security 
framework that remain subdued in the literature, agency and anxiety.  
Exploring conception(s) of agency is important for analytical, practical and ethical 
reasons;2 it touches on fundamental questions of free will and determinism, probing not only 
how individuals and collectives do act, but also how they could and should act. Notions of 
agency are thus central to theories of world politics,3 not least because they help account for 
phenomena of change, an issue that has long bedeviled the social constructivist literature.4 In 
approaching conceptions of agency offered by the ontological security framework it is important 
to separate out two motivational assumptions: (i) that having ontological security is a 
precondition for action, and (ii) that seeking ontological security is driving choices and 
behaviour. While the existing literature tends to highlight the first, this article holds that we need 
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to shift attention to the second reading, namely agency of seeking ontological security. If we take 
the existentialist roots of the framework seriously, conceptions of agency cannot be derived from 
being ontologically secure, but are expressed in the attempt to become ontologically secure.  
I explore the nature of this agency and its limitations by taking a careful look at the need 
for a ‘stable sense of Self’ and how it is satisfied. I do so by revisiting Giddens’ notion, building 
on R. D. Laing and Erik Erikson, that ontological security is obtained by putting into place 
“anxiety controlling mechanisms.”5 If seeking ontological security aims at ‘controlling anxiety’ 
by putting in place certain ‘mechanisms’, we must ask about the nature of those mechanisms and 
who is able to create, control, challenge and change them. But we still need to dig deeper: to 
meaningfully address the nature of these mechanisms and the agency behind them we need to 
have an understanding what they are supposed to control. We must grasp the origin and nature of 
anxiety. Thus, exploring the concept of anxiety and how it functions in the ontological security 
framework is the second aim of this article. In fact, it is the more foundational issue and needs to 
be tackled first. The article does this by focusing on the temporal dimension of being/the Self.6 
Going back to Kierkegaard’s original treatment and Heidegger’s existential phenomenology, the 
article reviews the emergence of anxiety as a core feature of the human condition and directs 
attention to what I call the ‘anxiety paradox’: the tendency of reflexive humans facing the 
freedom of being in time to attach themselves to constructs that provide a sense of temporal 
continuity, or certainty. I argue that because the existing ontological security literature is trapped 
in (parts of) this paradox, it cannot account for radical forms of agency.  
This argument connects with voices critical of the ontological security scholarship, 
specifically of the assumption that a stable sense of Self is a universal need and standard 
accounts how this need is met.7 Yet, I remain sympathetic to the framework to probe whether, 
perhaps, its underlying logic allows for a broader scope that can accommodate more diverse 
kind(s) of agency. The discussion proceeds in five steps. It starts by directing attention to the 
temporal sources of anxiety and its status as a foundational sentiment, or mood. It then outlines 
what I call the ‘anxiety paradox’, followed by a brief review of prominent strategies of 
controlling anxiety. The fourth step discusses three types of agency underpinning the anxiety 
paradox. The fifth part then outlines two potential avenues for integrating a reading of radical 
agency into the ontological security framework, followed by a short conclusion.  
 
 
From Uncertainty to Anxiety  
An engagement with the concept of anxiety requires recovering the existentialist 
foundations of the ontological security framework and discerning how ‘anxiety’ is related to and 
differs from the closely related concepts of ‘uncertainty’ and ‘fear’. My starting point is to see 
human existence embedded in three worldly dimensions, the social, the spatial and the temporal. 
A fundamental feature of this condition is uncertainty: we cannot read minds of others and don’t 
really know what they think or feel (the social); historical accounts are contested and we don’t 
really know what the future brings (the temporal); we are living on a planet containing an 
abundance of matter, whose moves we cannot control, and which is floating in an infinite space 
of which we know very, very little (the spatial). While humans have always tried to reduce these 
uncertainties by learning more about their social, temporal and spatial environment, ultimately 
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we have to accept that our knowledge is limited. We have to live with uncertainty. The question 
arising, then, is how uncertainty affects feeling, thinking and acting, and how it structures 
relations.  
In the field of IR, realist scholars have traditionally paid attention to this question 
drawing on Hobbesian logic. In their account, uncertainty constitutes a “condition of 
epistemological indeterminacy”8 in which states co-exist in continual danger of being attacked. 
While uncertainty is linked to an unknown future, realists place emphasis on the social 
dimension, that is, the inability to truly know the intentions of other states and what they will do 
with the capabilities at their disposal. Uncertainty thus generates a sense of physical insecurity 
and is expressed in distrust and fear as defining features of social relations. Fear of a future in 
which only death is certain turns into fear/distrust of the other, which provides the rationale for 
political arrangements that enable a life without such fear.9 Whereas for Hobbes the solution is a 
social contract in the form of the Leviathan, realists argue that rational actors must protect 
themselves by maximizing their military power.  
Ontological security scholarship offers a different approach by holding that uncertainty 
generates anxiety. Drawing on existentialist philosophy, this move is grounded in a logic that 
operates with a different conception of the subject and opens the door to a broader set of 
behavioural implications. I outline this logic here through Martin Heidegger’s discussion of the 
phenomenon of anxiety in his existentialist treatise ‘Being and Time’ [Sein und Zeit], which had 
a major influence on the development of the ontological security framework. Like Hobbes, 
Heidegger identifies uncertainty as a central factor structuring the human condition. Yet his 
discussion about the nature of uncertainty and its impact on being and social life takes a different 
route from Hobbes.10,11 For the purpose at hand two aspects stand out. First, Heidegger 
foregrounds the temporal dimension as the most important aspect affecting our understanding 
what it means to be, and notes that one’s own death is the one thing affecting being in a unique 
way. Death signifies the moment after which ‘being’ becomes impossible in the 
phenomenological sense,12 and it is only in death that the life span is complete. Until then, being 
remains incomplete. Rather than a finished whole, such as the state in the realist imaginary, the 
‘Self’ – which in IR terms usually takes the form of a political collective – is always in the 
process of coming-into-being, or becoming.  
Second, in Heidegger’s existentialist phenomenology, being in the world is significantly 
shaped by experience. It is impossible, however to have an experience of what it means to die, as 
even the death of a close family member is an experience that, ultimately, cannot be shared.13 
The implications of this seemingly trivial point are profound, because it allows problematizing 
the link between death and fear by pointing out that without being able to experience death it is 
impossible to know what to fear. We know that ‘death’ will happen, eventually, which makes it 
an integral part of life, but we are unable to comprehend/grasp it as a meaningful thing for 
ourselves. And so, while we can be certain about our inescapable finitude, we cannot really fear 
that which brings death about. We cannot ‘know’ the existential threat in the phenomenological 
sense. It is potentially everywhere and can appear out of nowhere,14 making contingency an 
                                                 
8 Williams 2005, 25. 
9 Epstein 2013. 
10 Odysseos 2002. 
11 See, however, Rumelili 2020. 
12 Heidegger 1953, 250. 
13 Ibid., §47, §52. 
14 Ibid., §40, 186, §52, 258. 
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inescapable feature of being in the world. The human response to this condition, Heidegger 
argues, is not fear but anxiety.15 Generated by the unknowability of death and of the future more 
generally, he identifies anxiety as the foundational sentiment or mood [Befindlichkeit] of the 
human condition from which more concrete wills or desires spring.16  
In short, whereas in the realist framework the actor is imagined as a complete whole (a 
clearly delineated sovereign state) and knows what to fear (other states with military resources), 
the actor in an ontological security framework is incomplete and conditioned by their inability to 
know, by anxiety. To understand what kind(s) of agency this generates, let us go over some 
accounts on the situations in which anxiety emerges and the human response to it.  
 
 
The Emergence of the Anxious Mind and the Anxiety Paradox 
Awareness of radical contingency is not a phenomenon of post-modern times. Rather, at 
least in the accounts of Western philosophy, it emerges at the moment of enlightenment – “man's 
emergence from his self-imposed…inability to use one's own understanding” to use Kant’s 
famous words.17 That is, anxiety enters our world once we become self-conscious and reflexive 
subjects. In the words of Alastair Hannay18 “Anxiety…is the mood in which human beings 
awaken to the peculiarly exposed vantage point they ‘enjoy’ by virtue of their specifically 
reflective form of awareness”. As this ‘awakening’ is considered a momentous occasion in the 
history of human development, writers have located its occurrence in significant contexts. A 
brief look at prominent examples illustrates the process and reveals a paradox at the heart of it.  
Soren Kirkegaard in his discussion of the Concept of Anxiety chooses the biblical story of 
Genesis as the setting. In this account, Adam living in the Garden of Eden is an innocent and 
ignorant being in a state of “peace and repose”;19 he feels no anxiety. This changes when Adam 
encounters the tree of knowledge. By eating the apple Adam looses his innocence/ignorance and 
not only brings sin and death into the world, but also anxiety. In fact, in Kierkegaard’s account 
anxiety arises already through the very prohibition of eating from the tree, because this 
constitutes the awareness that things could be otherwise: “the prohibition makes him anxious, 
because it awakens in him freedom’s possibility.”20 Kierkegaard thus sees anxiety coming not 
out of the inability to grasp ones’ finitude, but out of the awareness of having the ability to 
choose and, hence, of the infinitude of possibilities open to human beings. As he puts it “anxiety 
is freedom’s actuality as the possibility of possibility.”21 Although Kierkegaard focuses on 
morality rather than temporality as the framework within which anxiety arises, he makes an 
important observation: in the temptation to taste the forbidden fruit, Adam feels both drawn to 
and wants to flee from the freedom of possibility and, thus, anxiety. Here Kierkegaard identifies 
                                                 
15 Heidegger discusses the concept of anxiety through the notions of Angst and Sorge. It is common to translate Angst 
as ‘anxiety’ and Sorge as ‘care’, which can be misleading as Sorge has a double meaning in German, denoting  both 
‘care’ (the German Fürsorge) and ‘anxiety’. As I read him, Heidegger uses Sorge mainly in the latter sense, as a mood 
that contains and, in rare moments turns into Angst, but is different from it. 
16 Heidegger 1953, §41. 
17 Although the enlightenment is a core theme in liberal thought, I do not mean to present a story of progress or suggest 
that ‘Western civilization’ is the home of reflexivity.  
18 Hannay 2014, xxiii. 
19 Kirkegaard (1844) 2014, 50. 
20 Ibid., 54. 
21 Ibid., 51. 
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what he calls the dialectic property of anxiety “as a sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic 
sympathy” (Ibid, 51, italics in original).  
The dialectic in the human attitude towards ‘freedom’s possibility’ – of both feeling 
drawn to and wanting to flee from anxiety – is also found in readings of humans as temporal 
beings. It is illustrated in accounts by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno,22 as well as John 
Gunnell,23 who revoke another ‘place of origin’ popular in Western philosophy, ancient Greece. 
In this context, lives were embedded in myths and rythms of nature, in a cosmic creation ordered 
by the Gods. Humans did not see themselves as masters of their own fate and did not (need to) 
reflect on their own finitude; it was a world without anxiety.24 This changes in Homer’s epic 
poems the Iliad and Odyssey, where protagonists like Ulysses are given a sense of uniqueness 
and become aware of their mortality, partially claiming responsibility for their actions. However, 
the journey is also a struggle, exemplified in Ulysses’ deliberate alienation from and 
simultaneous surrender to the forces of nature during the encounter with the sirens.25 Temporal 
self-consciousness remains weak, as human existence is still oriented towards a tragic past from 
which there is no escape, and the possibility of immortality is maintained through the 
performance of god-like heroic deeds.26 This move of grasping but not fully embracing the 
unique temporal nature of human existence is also visible in Plato’s Republic. At one level, Plato 
criticizes Athenian society as ordered by values derived from myth and folk memory and 
emphasizes to instead embrace the human ability to shape the future. Plato famously does so by 
imagining five types of polis, yet in his account eternity can still be reached through the 
philosophers’ ability to envision and create a just order in which the soul can be embedded. That 
is, the enlightened human breaks with the gods, only to be tied to the polis as a permanent home, 
“an imperishable space” that transcends human time.27  
The emergence of nationalism, the (re)formation of self-consciousness on the collective 
level, offers another exemplary setting. In Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson28 
attributes the emergence of nationalism in Europe and Latin America to the spread of the novel 
and the newspaper. While often reduced to an argument about the rise of the publishing industry 
driven by capitalism’s search for new markets, a crucial component of Anderson’s argument is 
that the impact of the printed press was rooted in a transformed conception of time. Anderson 
describes societies where the decline of monarchical rule went hand in hand with the decline of 
cosmic or ‘Messianic time’ and the emergence of  secular ‘empty time’ (Benjamin) of 
modernity. This time was made meaningful by the printed press, which according to Anderson 
satisfied a demand for ‘simultaneity’ among individuals trying to find their place in this new 
temporal universe. By reading the same stories in newspapers and novels, these mediums created 
“the idea of a sociological organism” moving calendrically through time, a shared narrative that 
connected individuals to a ‘nation’ on a temporal plane.29 Similar moves can be observed in 
anticolonial struggles when colonized communities reject the temporal frame imposed on them 
by the colonizer and try to recover, or recreate, their own conception of being in time. Sankaran 
Krishna points to the link between such a collective narrative that provides “a content, a history, 
                                                 
22 Horkheimer and Adorno (1947) 1988. 
23 Gunnell 1987. 
24 Horkheimer and Adorno 1988, 33, 50ff; Gunnell 1987, 25ff. 
25 Horkheimer and Adorno 1988, 55, Exkurs 1. 
26 Gunnell 1987, 79–87. 
27 Ibid., 115. 
28 Anderson 2006. 
29 Ibid., 26. 
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a meaning, and a trajectory” for an independent society and cartographic representations 
affirming their place in a world of territorially sovereign states “as a timeless essence.”30,31  
Sweeping as these accounts may be, they illustrate a peculiar dynamic: reflexive humans 
gain temporal self-consciousness through emancipation from mythical, cosmic or colonial 
orders, yet in the process they create new knowledge which, as Horkheimer and Adorno 
famously argue, is not so different from the myth it sought to replace. If we read both the 
discarding and the refashioning of temporal orders as resulting from choices made by reflexive 
subjects, we are presented with a behavioral paradox: the subject strives for the ability to 
organize its being in time yet is reluctant to fully accept the newfound freedom. Awareness of 
being positioned in finite time and recognizing that past and future are dimensions affected by, 
and affecting, human activity, leads to the formulation of ‘post-mythical’ conceptions of time 
that do not embrace contingency but, instead, convey a desire to hold on to some sort of 
continuity and coherence by re-inventing a transcendental layer with an eternal perspective into 
which worldly existence is embedded. This, then, is what I call the anxiety paradox: Having 
wrestled agency from the gods, humans use this agency to recreate perhaps not the gods but the 
certainty they provided, thereby reducing the scope of their freedom.  
This move has long been recognised by those calling for emancipation from divine 
authority. Perhaps most famously, Nietzsche wondered how humanity would handle the 
‘nothingness’ that followed the death of god. Given that life without the metaphysical comfort of 
the Christian belief system also meant the death of the subject that had been constituted through 
this system, Nietzsche asked “How will we console ourselves, the murderers of all 
murderers!...What festivals of atonement, what holy games will we have to invent for ourselves? 
Is the magnitude of the deed not too great for us?”32 The ontological security literature in IR 
suggests that it is. With its “general presupposition…that actors prefer stability and certitude”33 it 
has squarely placed its focus on the latter aspect of the anxiety paradox. This focus is 
understandable. The notion that humans are unable, or unwilling, to embrace contingency and 
radical uncertainty about their being in the world and, instead, harbor a “desire for knowledge”34 
capable of providing coherence, consistency and continuity has been widely discussed in 
philosophy, psychology, psychoanalysis and sociology. Henri Bergson notes that the “natural 
inclination” of the mind is to proceed “by solid perceptions…and stable conceptions;”35 Lacan 
speaks of a human desire to compensate for the ‘lack’ of a ground on which the Self stands 
through processes of identification; David Harvey points to the appeal of the ‘eternal myth’ 
provided by modernism which “had to redeem us from the ‘formless universe of 
contingency;’”36 Norbert Elias notes the “longing for something permanent behind the 
impermanence of all observable data…for something imperishable…as the solid fundament of 
transient lives,”37 and Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann38 speak of “symbolic universes” 
                                                 
30 Krishna 1994, 508, 514. 
31 Krishna’s account of India diagnoses a persistent postcolonial anxiety of a society “trapped in time – former colony 
but pre-nation” (Krishna 1994, 517). 
32 Cited in Michelsen and Hirst 2013, 105. 
33 Browning and Joenniemi 2017, 31. 
34 Huysmans 1998, 236. 
35 Cited in Grosz 2005, 135. 
36 Harvey 1990, 31. 
37 Elias 1992, 128. 
38 Berger and Luckmann 1991 (1966), 119. 
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which bestow meaning upon death and thereby shelter the individual from the ‘ultimate terror’.39 
The assumption that humans seek cognitive consistency is also central to work in IR analysing 
the nature, sources and effects of perceptions, representations and identity.40 
To be clear, if we take Heidegger’s ontology of becoming seriously, the “need to 
experience oneself as a whole person in time”41 can never be fully satisfied. It remains, as Lacan 
would say, a fragile fantasy. 42 The corresponding understanding of anxiety as an ever-present 
mood that cannot be switched off renders the subject a perpetual ontological security seeker, in a 
constant effort to become, yet never really being, ontologically secure. Rather than depicting a 
subject constantly chasing something that is unobtainable, the ontological security literature 
holds that humans have devised effective mechanisms, often on the collective level, that control 
anxiety, to use Giddens’ terminology, and make it tolerable. These mechanisms provide a stock 
of knowledge – “the certainty that phenomena are real and that they possess specific 
characteristics”43 – that pushes uncertainty and the contingency of human existence into the 
background. Ontological security thus works on an emotional level: if anxiety is a feeling of 
discomfort, even ‘terror’, the knowledge put in place to control anxiety generates a feeling of 
comfort – a sense of epistemological peace.  
 
 
Three Mechanisms: Numbers, Practices, Narratives 
How do humans, upon recognizing that they are masters of their own past and future, 
attempt to extend themselves beyond ‘their’ time and re-inscribe their existence into a permanent 
temporal order outside human intervention? What are those anxiety-controlling mechanisms that 
enable humans to obtain “cognitive and behavioural certainty”44 and, hence, the epistemological 
peace they seek? For the purpose of illustration let me briefly review three: scientific measures 
using mathematical symbols and logic, routine practice, and narrative.  
First, there is the organisation of the temporal dimension through chronos, a linear 
succession of numbers and intervals that provide a scale into which all events and fluctuations 
can be neatly embedded. One influential form is ‘Western time’ that emerged with the project of 
modernity and is imagined as both passing in a linear fashion of successive and ‘empty’ units 
and as a “natural phenomenon”, part of an eternal order that exists external to human thought and 
action.45 Designed and supported mechanically and with computers, time becomes cognitively 
controllable and universally accessible through quantification and mathematical logic, manifest 
in the Western calendar, the 24-hour clock, and timetables that map out past and future.46 On this 
map, being in time can be recorded, managed and planned, thereby creating a sense of stability, 
if not certainty. It allows making the future ‘knowable’ through causal claims and the calculation 
of risks. Attempts to rationalize the future through mathematical probability, what Ian Hacking47 
                                                 
39 Ernest Becker speaks of the need for an “immortality formula” (Becker 1973, 255). 
40 Jervis 1976; Hopf 2002. 
41 Mitzen 2006, 342. 
42 For an application of Lacan in IR foregrounding the temporal dimension, see Solomon 2012. See also Arfi’s 
discussion of survival as constantly performing a ‘leap of faith’. 
43 Berger and Luckmann 1991 (1966), 13. 
44 Mitzen 2006, 342. 
45 Hutchings 2008, 6; Hom 2010. 
46 Elias 1992, 42, 123. 
47 Hacking 1990. 
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called the ‘taming of chance’, has become a central feature of the risk society characterizing 
Western modernity.  
The second mechanism, routine practices, is prominently discussed by Giddens48 and at 
the center of much of ontological security scholarship. While the social dimension – the sharing 
of practices – is important, the significance of routine practices in ordering time resides in the 
observation that they reduce contingency because of their repetitive nature. That is, they emit a 
familiarity that comes from being established in the past and carried into the present through 
formal or informal institutional rules. Although taking place in a moment, a routine act is not a 
contingent experience but implies temporal continuity by holding the assurance of tradition and 
the promise to be carried on in the future, whether it is a micro-level routine taking place every 
day, or a grand ritual taking place once a year. By plucking the individual into what Giddens 
calls the ‘longue duree’ of institutional time, routine practices provide a structural frame the 
individual can hold onto not only for predicting social interactions but to experience the illusion 
of permanence and, hence, immortality.  
The insight that narratives lend human existence a sense of temporal continuity and 
purpose is well established in the literature. Narratives enable us to meaningfully situate 
ourselves in past and future and “deal with life as it unfolds over time,”49 which even leads to the 
suggesting that humans have a “natural impulse to narrate.”50 Scholars have discussed the power 
of poetry and scriptures in creating ‘spaces of remembrance’ that carry being into the 
‘afterworld,’51 or the enduring attraction of utopias and dystopias.52 Offering coherent and 
capturing stories of how life unfolds, or should unfold, beyond the biological life span of 
individuals is central to both religious doctrines and prominent secular philosophies of, for 
instance, Kant, Hegel, and Marx.53 Although these meta-narratives differ regarding the relative 
openness of the future, they all picture the world on a path through time and invite us to travel 
along and to optimize our standing on it. As Hom and Steele54 point out, such narratives are 
often located in the international realm.  
These three mechanisms are neither exhaustive55 nor mutually exclusive, and they often 
intersect for enhanced effect. Furthermore, we can see them playing out on the level of both the 
observed (the social world studied) and the observer (the scholar explaining this world). That is, 
we can analyze how numbers, routine practices and narratives are mobilized by and guide 
political actors, and how they are incorporated in scholarly methodologies to tame the 
contingency of world politics and strengthen the vague contours of IR as an academic discipline. 
Whatever form they take, as a potent answer to an existentialist problematique and a significant 
factor in the organisation of social life, anxiety-controlling mechanisms are political, and their 
creation, maintenance and challenge a matter of politics. At the same time, for anxiety 
controlling mechanisms to function effectively their invented nature must be forgotten, hidden, 
or seen as coming out of an extraordinary mind and upheld by respected authorities to dispel 
doubt of their contingent nature. After all, something seen as a random human construct will not 
have the sustainable power to tame anxiety. Thus, they must become part of reality, understood 
                                                 
48 Giddens 1984. 
49 Ringmar 1996, 451. 
50 White 1987, 1. 
51 Assmann 1999, 39–43. 
52 Berenskoetter 2011 and 2014. 
53 On immortality ideologies in Western philosophy, see Sheets-Johnstone 2003. 
54 Hom and Steele 2020. 
55 Other prominent mechanisms are role images, maps, or architecture. See also Zarakol 2017. 
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as “the quality appertaining to phenomena that we recognise as having a being independent of 
our own volition.”56 The problem is that this reading downplays agency. 
 
 
The Question of Agency 
As long as we understand anxiety-controlling mechanisms as human creations, and 
attachment to them as a ‘leap of faith,’57 agency must be an important part of the picture. In fact, 
the dialectic noted by Kierkegaard and captured in the anxiety paradox outlined earlier points to 
more than one kind of agency.  
The first kind is emancipatory agency. It is the agency closely tied to the understanding 
of the enlightenment as an act of liberation. It comes to the fore in the realisation of having a 
choice and the ‘courage to use one’s own mind’. Put in temporal terms, it understands that the 
future and, to some extent, the past is an open terrain. This agency gains its contours in Ulysses’ 
journey and in Adam becoming aware of the ability to act otherwise and, thus, is not simply an 
agency that just ‘is’, but an emerging (awareness of having) agency that questions existing 
worldly constraints and seeks to liberate being from them. It is expressed in a subject that acts 
upon the recognition that things can be different and confident in its ability to transform one’s 
being in the world. It is a kind of agency that can bring about, in the words of Ernesto Laclau, the 
“absolute chasm…between the emancipatory moment and the social order that has preceded 
it.”58 Such radical agency is perhaps most clearly exemplified in the moment of initiating revolt 
against an existing political order and the system of governance keeping it in place. Actors that 
disrupt order and shock the system may be celebrated as ‘strong’ and ‘inspirational’ leaders, 
even ‘heroes’, by those hoping to benefit from the act of liberation, and considered ‘foolish’, 
‘dangerous’ and ‘destructive’ by those comfortably embedded in the existing order.  
The second kind may be called creative-constitutive agency. It comes to the fore in 
reaction to an event that undermines existing mechanism and thereby destabilizes conceptions of 
being in time, in turn generating demand for the creation of (new) mechanisms.59 It is the Plato 
who, having escaped the cave/gods, rebuilds the idea of an eternal order in the vision of the city 
and places himself within it; it transpires in Anderson’s account of collectives who replace the 
divine order of messianic time with a secular biographical narrative told through the printed 
press. The IR literature has discussed such acts of (re)creation following wars and the loss, 
breakdown of familiar political order and systems of meaning they generate.60 It can also be 
found in Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington, whose narratives of global order provided 
epistemological peace for many post-Cold War minds; in the US government’s response to the 
September 11, 2001 attacks by encouraging habitual behaviour and offering a simplistic ‘war on 
terror’ narrative;61 or in the revival of religious nationalism in India in response to destabilizing 
forces of globalization.62 
The third kind of agency is the muted agency of those who, thrown into a world replete 
with anxiety stabilising mechanisms, cannot or, rather, do not want to question let alone escape 
from them. It is agency that fits into, functions within, and sustains existing mechanisms. Doing 
                                                 
56 Berger and Luckmann (1966) 1991, 13. 
57 Arfi 2020. 
58 Laclau 1996, 1. 
59 Often by drawing on an available cultural repertoire (Cash 2020). 
60 Bially Mattern 2005; Jackson 2006; Subotic 2016. 
61 Williams 2005; Solomon 2014. 
62 Kinnvall 2006. 
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so may “feel agentic,”63 but it merely involves acting out a role in a given script, at best moving 
along in the process of ‘structuration.’64 It is a reproductive agency and minimally creative in the 
conservative sense. Studies have shown how political actors chose to sustain existing 
mechanisms in the form of biographical narratives65 or routine practices,66 especially in periods 
of material change,67 or navigate tensions between multiple but equally valued 
narratives/practices through a strategy of avoidance.68 In the field of IR, we find this muted 
agency in realist and liberal theories, where agents are placed on a particular temporal path and 
must work to optimize their standing on it. More generally, it applies to anyone working within a 
particular worldview handed down to them, unwilling to question its assumptions and traditional 
content, and thereby reproducing its epistemic comfort and authority.  
These three kinds of agency capture different ways of manifesting being in time, with 
direct effects on social-political order, and must thus be understood as forms of political agency. 
The ontological security literature is primarily concerned with the second and third kind, often 
without differentiating between the two. Indeed, to my knowledge, there are no studies using the 
ontological security framework that explore and explain phenomena of emancipatory agency in 
its radical sense. As such, the literature effectively focuses on only one aspect of the anxiety 
paradox, namely the move to create certainty and gain epistemological peace.  
This limitation could be justified by noting the importance of shining light on the creation 
and the uneventful maintenance of anxiety-controlling mechanisms that structure international 
relations. While this is a valid position, the reason for neglecting emancipatory agency is not 
simply due to an analytical preference for explaining the persistence of particular orders or forms 
of interaction. Rather, it is because the framework has made the human need for stability its core 
assumption, which renders it ill suited for explaining radical change. In fact, it cannot explain it. 
As currently devised, the ontological security framework has no place for emancipatory agency 
because it is stuck with the assumption that the possibility of a radically open future generates a 
heightened state of anxiety and, as such, ontological insecurity.69 More importantly, it links 
ontological insecurity to inaction. Echoing a psychological argument relayed by Giddens, the 
assumption is that reflection about the contingency of our lives, especially about our unknowable 
yet inescapable death, will make subjects “overwhelmed by anxieties”70 and generate a sort of 
‘deer in the headlight’ paralysis. This view is logically accompanied by the view that ‘having 
ontological security’ is the precondition for action: whereas “fundamental uncertainty” is 
paralysing,71 having anxiety-controlling mechanisms in place provides the basic trust that allows 
subjects to ‘get on’ with their lives.72 ‘Getting on’ here means having the capacity to cope with 
life’s ups and downs, including some change, yet it does not mean seeking radical change. This 
logic cannot accommodate an agency driven solely by the desire that things should be otherwise, 
rejecting temporal certainties and accepting an uncertain future, as that would not only amount to 
                                                 
63 Mitzen 2006, 347. 
64 Giddens 1984. 
65 Steele 2005, 2008. 
66 Mitzen 2006. 
67 Subotic 2016. 
68 Lupovici 2012. 
69 Kinnvall 2006; Steele 2008; Croft 2012; Rumelili 2014. 
70 Giddens 1991, 37. 
71 Mitzen and Schweller 2011, 39. 
72 Mitzen 2006, 346. 
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choosing a state of insecurity but also fundamentally contradict the premise that certainty is a 
precondition for action.   
One may counter that it is analytically artificial to separate emancipatory and creative-
constitutive agency by holding that all actors seeking to escape existing mechanisms do so while 
simultaneously setting up new/alternative ones. In other words, disruption and creation occur 
together, aided by the availability of a variety of different mechanisms to chose from.73 This 
overlaps with studies using the ontological security framework to account for gradual change.74 
While this is a reasonable step forward, the question remains how we arrive at the moment of 
transition. Shifting attention to gradual change cannot bypass the fact that the ontological 
security framework is ill equipped to see or explain the will to shed existing anxiety controlling 
mechanisms. Ultimately, as Ernesto Laclau75 reminds, emancipation is “not an act of creation but 
instead of liberation”. Because it cannot accommodate the desire to open things up, current 
scholarship on ontological security does not have an intellectual place for agency that simply 
wants to (and can) escape existing mechanisms, that makes a radical move of liberation, if only 
for a moment. The conservative bias of the framework not only renders it unsuitable for 
explaining revolutionary leadership. The inability to logically account for a radical form of 
agency and chart a way out of an existing configuration is also problematic for normative 
reasons, especially when looking at cases where anxiety-controlling mechanisms support 
conflict.76 Thus, it is not surprising that the ontological security literature, specifically its 
assumption that a stable sense of Self is a universal human need and the acceptance of modern 
strategies to satisfy this need, received stinging criticism.77   
 
 
Radical Agency and Anxiety: Two Possible Avenues 
Rather than discarding the notion of ontological security altogether, let us contemplate 
the possibility of expanding its scope by probing ontologies that take the temporality of being, 
and the sources of anxiety, seriously, yet which can accommodate more radical kinds of agency. 
Going back to philosophy helps. After all, human activity geared towards finding stabilising 
mechanisms and eradicating inconsistencies and vulnerabilities in their design has long been 
criticized in Western thought as a betrayal of the emancipatory promise of the enlightenment. 
Already Kant complained: 
 
“Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why such a large part of mankind gladly 
remain minors all their lives, long after nature has freed them from external 
guidance. They are the reasons why it is so easy for others to set themselves up as 
guardians. It is so comfortable to be a minor.”78 
 
                                                 
73 See Cash 2020; Vieira 2017. 
74 Berenskoetter and Giegerich 2010; Rumelili 2015. 
75 Laclau 1996, 1. 
76 Mitzen 2006; Rumelili 2015. 
77 Rossdale 2015a; Lebow 2017. Reminiscent of the earlier poststructuralist critique of naturalised notions of 
identity, the charge is that the ontological security literature operates with a modern form of subjectivity as an ideal, 
which is problematic both empirically and ethically as it forecloses the reality and possibility of more open forms of 
subjectivity 
78 Kant 1959, emphasis added. 
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Kant’s dismay about the easiness with which humans succumb to epistemological peace 
is echoed by a long list of Western thinkers including Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Bergson, 
Heidegger, Horkheimer and Adorno, Foucault, Derrida, Butler, Bauman – the list could go on. 
Crudely put, the critique has two themes: that attachment to those mechanisms (i) limits 
individual freedom and creativity and (ii) hampers authentic being. While quite different in 
character, these two concerns meet in the critique that the propensity of humans to surround 
themselves with a seemingly comforting structure constrains capacity for and, indeed, prevents a 
more profound kind of agency. Scientific time, routine practices and narratives may function as 
anxiety controlling mechanisms, but they prevent the Self from ‘true’ being and acting. Such 
diagnoses usually entail a call for resisting, intervening in and escaping from, indeed 
overthrowing these mechanisms and the social systems they carry.  
Understood in temporal terms, it calls for a kind of agency attached to kairos, which 
stands for discontinuity and the suspension of order. It is an in-between space of absolute 
freedom and, thus, contingency.79 As such, it captures the temporal form of the emancipatory 
moment and also designates a particular experience of time. As Kim Hutchings shows, kairos 
has been discussed by thinkers from Machiavelli to Arendt and is generally understood as 
designating a “transformational time of action.”80 In the same vein, kairotic agency is seen as 
empowered by a positive attitude towards the contingency of fortune, the ability to learn and 
reflect and a “fundamental human capacity for renewal.”81 Incorporating such a radical form of 
agency into the ontological security framework is a significant challenge and beyond the scope 
of this article. However let me outline two avenues for thinking about kairotic agency. Although 
quite different in character, they meet in discarding the reading of anxiety as a background 
sentiment that has to be controlled.  
The first avenue emphasises the incomplete nature of being and the need to embrace the 
productive potential of the contingent experiences underpinning anxiety. It has some similarities 
with the postmodern take of being as, in the words of David Harvey, swimming, even 
wallowing, in the chaotic currents of change and to embrace fragmentation and ephemerality “in 
an affirmative fashion.”82 It views social order as incomplete and full of tensions and 
contradictions, with agency emerging through the cracks of these (dis)orders and gaining life 
through plural and fleeting encounters. It is captured in Judith Butler’s conception of 
performative agency subverting existing systems through creative processes of resignification,83 
or Ned Lebow’s emphasis on role-playing as “a form of play that invites subjunctive “as-if” 
mechanisms of disguise, substitution and recombination.”84 These accounts conceive of agency 
primarily through existing social arrangements rather than the temporal dimension, however.  
More useful is Henri Bergson’s conception of a Self that bundles contingent and multiple 
worldly experiences into a distinct sense of what he calls “inner time” through a process of 
“creative evolution.”85 This inner time is grounded in the intensity of the sensations, triggered by 
worldly events, which collapse past, present and future into a singular but not homogenous 
conception of being in time. Bergson captures this creative process through the concept of 
‘duration’, “a mode of temporal synthesis that…knits temporal dimensions together as in a 
                                                 
79 O Murchadha 1999, 106. 
80 Hutchings 2008, 5. 
81 Ibid., 33, 50, 62. 
82 Harvey 1991, 44. 
83 Butler 1990. 
84 Lebow 2012, 285. 
85 See Guerlac 2006. 
 13 
melody” Guerlac.86 Crucially, the fusion of diverse experiences is a source of energy, and when 
drawing on these experiences the Self is “closer to dreaming than to knowing” and its 
movements take the form of “dancing.”87 This account of agency is not goal-oriented or about 
making rational choices, instead it highlights intuition and passion.88 In its expression it is 
similar to the Nietzschean conception of The Dancer discussed by Chris Rossdale, whereby the 
dance is understood as “a metaphor for a mobile and creative radical subjectivity.”89 The 
Bergsonian perspective grounds this figure in the temporal dimension and opens the door to a 
conceptualisation of being distinct from social order and not paralysed by anxiety: because 
contingent experiences are fused into an evolving “inner time” that serves as a creative force, the 
Self is not bothered by the indeterminacy of the future. In fact, it does not worry about the future 
or even conceive of the future as a significant space, but dances seemingly aimlessly through the 
world, which lends it the potential for radical agency. 
The second avenue brings us back to Heidegger and his suggestion that anxiety can be 
suspended in a moment of ‘being-towards-death’, which endows the Self with the resolve 
[Entschlossenheit] of kairotic agency.90 This agency is about the act of stepping out of the Man 
and, in contrast to accounts that see the future as a continuation of the past, separates the former 
from the latter, thereby opening the future as future.91 The Heideggerian avenue thus maintains 
the importance of the future and the inevitability of death as the reference for conceptualising 
being and, thus, agency. It has to do so because in Heideggerian logic the uncertain future is the 
primary source of anxiety and generates the condition that prevents being from fully being itself. 
Consequently, an account of kairotic agency must reconfigure how being relates to the future 
and, in particular, the possibility of death. This is not the place to explore what exactly ‘facing 
death’ involves, except to note that for Heidegger it designates a state of mind in which death is 
accepted as a possibility and integrated into being as finite and, thus, whole.92 It is a moment in 
which conscience calls upon being to accept the “simplicity of fate,”93 to see its future as open 
and to clearly identify possible forms this future might take, including death. In this 
reconfiguration of being as being-towards-death, anxiety is suspended. More precisely, anxiety is 
replaced by fear, which pulls the Self out of its “complacent absorption in everydayness”94 and 
allows being to “find itself.”95 For Heidegger this state of what he calls authentic being is an 
exception, though, a rare occurrence that emerges suddenly and unexpectedly and is experienced 
as a moment of singularization [Vereinzelung].96 In this moment being leaves behind the existing 
order of things and embraces its future as a space of distinct possibilities, including the 




                                                 
86 Ibid., 66. 
87 Ibid., 47ff. 
88 Grosz 2005; Guerlac 2006. 
89 Rossdale 2015b, 129. 
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91 O Murchadha 1999, 27. 
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96 Ibid., 187ff, 336ff 
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This article attempted to contribute to scholarship on ontological security by making 
three conceptual interventions. First, through Heidegger and Kierkegaard, it brought to the 
forefront the temporal structure of the concept of anxiety, noted its status as a foundational 
background sentiment, or mood, of the human condition, and pointed to the paradoxical trait of 
reflexive humans to both being drawn to and seeking to escape anxiety. Second, it noted that the 
current literature on ontological security grounds its logic of human behavior, in particular the 
need to construct and maintain anxiety-controlling mechanisms, in one aspect of this paradox, 
namely the search for certainty.. It argued that this conception of ontological security has 
significant implications for agency as under this logic the framework cannot account for 
emancipatory agency. Third, drawing on Bergson and Heidegger, the article outlined two 
avenues of thought that open the door for more radical forms of agency for temporal beings.  
Scholarship on ontological security currently appears to be trapped in the conservative 
bias of the framework, which raises the question whether it faces an aporia – “a self-engendered 
paradox beyond which it cannot press”97 – or whether accounts of radical/kairotic agency can be 
integrated into the framework. For IR scholars the stakes are not simply philosophical but 
whether the ontological framework is useful for seeing and explaining phenomena of radical 
action and change in world politics. The two avenues sketched towards the end dissolve the 
anxiety paradox by either embracing or suspending anxiety. This does not make them necessarily 
incompatible, in fact there are fruitful points of connection:98 both work in the phenomenological 
tradition and both highlight the ‘internal’ configuration of temporal being, a form of what 
Kirkegaard termed the ‘subjective spirit’. And there might be ways of combining Bergson’s view 
of how the experience of contingency is a source of creative energies with Heidegger’s emphasis 
on being as oriented towards the future and, especially, death. In any case, the central question is 
whether kairotic agency signifies an ontologically secure being. One might argue that a being 
that accepts contingency and turns it into a productive life force is the fullest, perhaps the only 
expression of ontologically secure being. Then again, if ontological security is about gaining a 
stable sense of Self through temporal continuity, can it integrate a revolutionary agency, which 
by default celebrates instability and discontinuity? The alternative route would be to entertain an 
agency that embraces ontological insecurity and, thus, the incomplete nature of being. In this 
vein, the most productive approach might be to rebuild the framework on a full appreciation of 
the anxiety paradox. Recovering the neglected side of the dialectic identified by Kirkegaard, 
namely being drawn to freedom’s possibility, would require balancing the yearning for certainty 
with a penchant for curiosity. Until then, the question of radical agency shakes the intellectual 
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